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INSTRUMENTALIZATION AS A SIN OF UNTRUTH
Whoever has been cheated 
turns into an object. 
M. Bakhtin
But where have we strayed to? We are ques-
tioning concerning technology, and we have 
arrived now at alétheia, at revealing. What 
has the essence of technology to do with re-
vealing? The answer: everything. For every 
bringing-forth is grounded in revealing.
M. Heidegger 
Abstract
The reconstructions, analyses and discussions concerning various broadly un­
derstood instrumentalized objects available in the subject literature allow one 
to distinguish and identify at least two interrelated forms of instrumentaliza­
tion – a weak and a strong form. The former consists of using a particular ob­
ject for fulfilling an aim in its unspecific functions. Thus, it can be treated as 
opposite to the phenomenon of functional fixation. The essence of the latter is 
a change in the position of the instrumentalized object, both in the ontological 
and axiological order – one which is a degrading change. It is this form of in­
strumentalization which allows the possibility of its reinterpretation in the cat­
egories of a sin of untruth. Such reinterpretation makes use of the multitude of 
forms of truth and their interrelationships, as well as of the distinction between 
a “great and small truth.” Thus, the heuristic value of the rhetoric of sin used 
here enables one to emphasise some important factual aspects. Firstly, refer­
ring to many possible dimensions in which instrumentalization can be subjected 
to evaluation, sin will be treated here metaphorically (due to taking into ac­
count all dimensions together) and literally (in order to highlight in consequence 
its moral, conscious and intended character). Secondly, this rhetoric can reflect 
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the complex structure of instrumentalization, expressed in the categories of 
a sin committed “in thought, word, deed and omission,” of a light or heavy na­
ture, with violation carried out on the nature of the instrumentalized object as 
its extreme form. Thirdly, rhetoric allows one to understand the perpetrator of 
instrumentalization’s activation of disguising, justifying or even absolving his 
activities. Fourthly, this results in seeking out the psychological mechanism of 
“being led into temptation.” Its complex character can be clearly seen in many 
cases, especially in the case of political instrumentalization of religion, where, 
on the one hand, the profanation of religion takes place, while on the other, the 
legitimisation, ennoblement or even sacralisation of politics occurs. 
Keywords: destitute time, instrumentalization, self-assertion, sin of untruth, 
strong form of instrumentalization, technology, truth of being, weak form of 
instrumentalization
INTRODUCTION
The rhetoric of sin used in the title of this study is meant to emphasise 
the constitutive moment of instrumentalization, i.e. a violation committed 
on the nature of an object used as a means to achieve an intended goal 
(purpose, end). I will use these categories interchangeably – as appropriate 
to the context. It should be stressed that this concerns rhetoric and not 
metaphorics, as sin is to be understood here literally and not metaphori­
cally. This sin is the sin of untruth, which is guided by the two essays of 
Martin Heidegger used in this text, namely: The Question Concerning Tech-
nology (1977) and What Are Poets For? (1971). These works should be read 
in the context of his concept of ontological truth. In this context, it does 
not seem completely absurd to reach also for Mikhail Bakhtin’s thesis, re­
ferring to the category of epistemological truth – in his view, a lie turns 
a deceived man into an object. It is therefore also a sin against his nature 
and, finally, his truth.
The part of the first of Heidegger’s texts (The Question Concerning Tech-
nology) quoted above as one of the mottos of this paper, not only justifies 
the use of this rhetoric, but also determines the structure of these consid­
erations. These will actually constitute a presentation of Heidegger’s argu­
ment for the very strong “everything” used here, regarding the relationship 
between technology and truth (alétheia). It seems that the relationship be­
tween technology and truth cannot be expressed more strongly than this 
motto does. As it turns out, this “everything” concerns relationships with 
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the truth of a strongly and weakly understood concept of instrumentaliza­
tion. Although this distinction is present in the subject literature, it does 
not use these characteristic epithets. Political science talks about the ne­
cessity of making instrumental decisions and then their implementation in 
a situation where there are no “ready-made” connections regarding (in­
tended) goals and methods, or the means of their implementation, focusing 
mainly on their rationality/irrationality (Borkowska-Nowak 2012). There is 
a phrase “means-end readiness” in neobehaviorism, a distinction that can 
also be found in everyday language and everyday life: although we know 
what we want to achieve, we need to decide on the ways or means – a kind 
of instrumentarium – that must be used to achieve the intended goal.
This does not always have to mean the case of a nefarious or unwor­
thy, even sinful “use” of what constitutes this instrumentarium, contrary to 
its nature – mainly an ontic state – and axiological position. In the extreme 
case, there does not always have to be a violation of the nature of the ob­
ject. In other words, it is not always the sin of untruth that is committed by 
“thought, speech, deed and neglect.” This “not always” suggests the use­
fulness, and maybe even the need to reach for heuristic values regarding 
the analysis of these two forms of instrumentalization, using Heidegger’s 
two texts. It is impossible to overestimate even the possibility of show­
ing, thanks to such a comparative analysis, or more precisely, a contrastive 
analysis, the specific nature of the strong form of instrumentalization in 
order to display the sinful nature in all its doubtful splendour.
The comparative analysis of two forms of instrumentalization set out 
here imposes a three-part structure on the text. Firstly, I will use Hei­
degger’s first text to present the weak form of instrumentalization, focus­
ing on its relationship with the truth. The second text will then serve to 
show its strong form, also with a focus on its relationship with the truth. 
For understandable reasons, everything that is not directly related to the 
title question must remain aside; it is a pity that there will be no room for 
such beautiful things as the role of poetry, specifically that of Rainer Maria 
Rilke. In the third part I will show the heuristic values that are proper to the 
rhetoric of sin used in the conceptualization of the strong form of instru­
mentalization. Of course, here I will not develop the problems by Heidegger 
just signalled and not further developed in this context – for example:
– the origin of causality problem (Heidegger 1977, 308);
– the problem of the usefulness/uselessness of religion in explaining 
the position and role;
INSTRUMENTALIZATION AS A SIN OF UNTRUTH 95
– of the human and non-human, i.e. the instrumental factor (Hei­
degger 1977, 302); 
– the problem of an actor or agent who directs a challenge to man 
before man challenges nature (Heidegger 1977, 299); 
– in the problem regarding the distribution of emphases in the under­
standing of causality – it seems that this idea can be best expressed 
by distinguishing between effective control and cognitive control, in 
which there is nothing of agency (Heidegger 1977, 304). 
More important than the answers to them is the fact that these ques­
tions were asked at all, as without them all the analyses are somewhat 
suspended in a vacuum. I hope, therefore, that the whole text will provide 
sufficient justification for the multitude of quotes and their length, con­
cerning the language analyses dictated by Heidegger, mainly etymological, 
in the field of Greek and German. Although he compared Plato’s dynamics 
of meanings of the category of “idea” with his own actions regarding the 
category of “enframing,” he kept his distance from them. In addition, Hei­
degger himself, wrote that: “(…) the use of the word Gestell as the name 
for the essence of modern technology, which we are venturing, is almost 
harmless” (Heidegger 1977, 301).
Thus, these categories allow us to capture such moments and threads 
that have been absent up to now in the conducted analyses, and which 
turn out to be particularly important. 
In Heidegger’s texts, I will try to look for arguments both for the gen­
eral approach to instrumentalization in terms of the sin of untruth, and for 
examining its possible internal differentiation, and thus the possibility of 
distinguishing some of its forms. Therefore, it can be said that the former 
is a general goal, while the latter is a specific objective.
1. WEAK FORM OF INSTRUMENTALIZATION – RECONSTRUCTION 
OF SELECTED TOPICS HEIDEGGER’S THE QUESTION 
CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY
Heidegger’s starting point for his analysis of technology is a naive or then 
contemporary view of it: “The current conception of technology, accord­
ing to which it is a means and a human activity, can therefore be called 
the instrumental and anthropological definition of technology.” (Heidegger 
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1977, 288). The author thus distinguishes two topics – instrumental and 
anthropological. Within this first topic, two parts can be clearly distin­
guished – one concerning technology per se and the other concerning 
modern technology. Modern technology should be analysed separately, as 
in Heidegger’s view this first proposition can raise doubts as to the scope 
of its validity due to its too strong links with the tradition of Greek thought 
and not be adequate to the approach of modern technology. In this con­
text, a separate analysis of modern technology can serve as a kind of test 
of the overall validity of the view expressed here. 
The possibility of such analyses by Heidegger seems to be confirmed 
by the structure of relevant arguments. Both in the first part, concern­
ing technology per se, and in the second part, concerning modern tech­
nology, we first deal with the presented definition, followed by the pres­
entation of various forms of the analysed technology, in order that the 
same disturbing question is finally posed. Indeed, this question appears 
for the first time in the form of “Where have we strayed to?”, or do we 
only think that we have strayed? In a moment, it will turn out that what 
looked like a straying was actually discovery. The second time this ques­
tion appears in a slightly weaker form, namely “Where are we?”. We re­
ceive an answer to these questions – in the first case, one so strong that 
the stronger “everything” is gone, and in the second, one slightly weaker, 
indicating the starting point. Finally, we receive a justification for this re­
sponse – one which is strong in the first case, and slightly weaker in the 
second.
1.1. Although this initial contemporary definition is generally considered 
correct, Heidegger himself has reservations about such an assessment due 
to the ambiguous connections between correctness and grasping the es­
sence of things. This is because, according to Heidegger, instrumentality is 
based on various types of causal relationships, including the “means-end” 
relationship. As long as we do not know the essence of causality and the 
essence of instrumentality, one’s sense of validity of the initial contempo­
rary understanding may prove to be unfounded. Therefore, Heidegger’s 
natural and expected development of the issue of causality is best sum­
marised in a register of the categories he subsequently introduced, a com­
mentary on their interrelationships and how they relate to the four types 
of causes proposed by Aristotle (Heidegger 1977, 290–294). Indeed, they 
are simply used to articulate them.
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Here are some examples:
The modes of occasioning the four causes, are at play, then, within bringing-
forth. Through bringing-forth the growing things of nature as well as whatever 
is completed through the crafts and the arts come at any given time to their 
appearance. 
But how does bringing-forth happen, be it in nature or in handwork and art? 
What is the bringing-forth in which the fourfold way of occasioning plays? Oc­
casioning has to do with the presencing [Anwesen] of that which at any giv­
en time comes to appearance in bringing-forth. Bringing-forth brings out of 
concealment into unconcealment. Bringing-forth comes to pass only insofar 
as something concealed comes into unconcealment. This coming rests and 
moves freely within what we call revealing [das Entbergen]. The Greeks have 
the world alétheia for revealing. The Roman translate this with veritas. We say 
“truth” and usually understand it as correctness of representation. (…) 
For every bringing-forth is grounded in revealing. Bringing-forth, indeed, gath­
ers within itself the four modes of occasioning – causality – and rules them 
throughout. Within its domain belong end and means as well as instrumental­
ity. Instrumentality is considered to be the fundamental characteristic of tech­
nology. If we inquire step by step into what technology, represented as means, 
actually is, the we shall arrive at revealing (…). 
Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If 
we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology 
will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth (Heidegger 
1977, 293–294).
This long quote seems to summarise and confirm perfectly Heidegger’s 
understanding of the aforementioned categories for the articulation of 
causation. It also shows this direction of reflection, which at some point 
seems to arouse surprise and even anxiety. Therefore, it shows: 
– how the fundamental question arises, namely “What does the es­
sence of technology have to do with discovery?”;
– what is the strongest possible answer to it? (“everything”); 
– what are the reasons for this answer?
This type of approach was confirmed by other Heidegger’s analyses 
referring to the special relationship between techne and episteme pre­
sent in the Greek tradition (to Plato). These were then treated as different 
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forms of widely understood cognition, namely understanding, insight or 
discernment.
1.2. The starting point for a separate analysis of modern technology is the 
posing of an explicit question and an immediately given answer promis­
ing to show unambiguously the novel nature of this technology: “What is 
modern technology? It too is a revealing. Only when we allow our atten­
tion to rest on this fundamental characteristic does that which is new in 
modern technology show itself to us” (Heidegger 1977, 298). Heidegger’s 
further argumentation focuses on the precise presentation of this novel 
nature: “The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the 
character of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth” (Heidegger 
1977, 297). The context of this view and further arguments concerning 
the relationship between modern technology and natural sciences seem 
to justify talking about this challenge as somehow laying charges against 
nature. This can occur in various forms. Heidegger has two sets of these 
forms. One set includes unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and 
switching about (Heidegger 1977, 298). In the second set, they are placed 
in the categories of setting upon, ordering, and standing-reserve (Hei­
degger 1977, 299). To this must be added another category with a high­
lighted position in both sets: “The essence of modern technology shows 
itself in what we call enframing” (Heidegger 1977, 305). These all have 
two characteristic qualities, namely regulation and protection: “Regulat­
ing and securing even become the chief characteristics of the revealing 
that challenges” (Heidegger 1977, 298). Although the distinguished posi­
tion of this item is associated with the fact that this characteristic is the 
essence of modern technology, it is, paradoxically, nothing technological 
in itself. It leads to two forms – producing and presenting – which are 
ways of discovering truth: “Both are ways of revealing, of alétheia.” (Hei­
degger 1977, 302). 
In this context Heidegger’s question: “What kind of unconcealment is 
it, then, that is peculiar to that which results from this setting upon that 
challenges?” (Heidegger 1977, 298) must naturally appear. Equally natural 
is another question and its answer, namely: “Where do we find ourselves if 
now we think one step further regarding what enframing itself actually is? 
It is nothing technological, nothing on the order of machine. It is the way in 
which the real reveals itself (…)” (Heidegger 1977, 305).
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1.3. The subject of anthropology in Heidegger’s analyses is focused on the 
extraordinary complexity of the man-technology relationship and, ulti­
mately, on the unconcealedness of truth. This dialectical complexity can 
already be seen in the very structure of the argument – subsequent state­
ments correspond to these particular “buts,” while the contradiction of 
these theses and antitheses refutes the final synthesis. 
This dialectic is already visible in the first question and the answer 
to it. The starting point for these analyses is the question:
Who accomplishes the challenging setting-upon through which what we call 
the real is revealed as standing reserve? Obviously, man. (…) But man does not 
have control over unconcealment itself, in which at any given time the real 
shows itself or withdraws. (…) Only to the extent that man for his part is al­
ready challenged (…). Yet precisely because man is challenged more originally 
than are the energies of nature, i.e. into the process of ordering (…) as a way of 
revealing (Heidegger 1977, 299–300). 
The next question concerns the circumstances, conditions, measures 
and ways all this occurs:
Where and how does this revealing happen if it is no mere handiwork of man? 
We need not look far. (…) Wherever man opens his eyes and ears, unlocks his 
heart, and gives himself over to mediating and striving, shaping and working, 
entreating and thanking, he finds himself everywhere already brought into the 
unconcealed. The unconcealment of the unconcealed has already come to pass 
whenever it calls man forth into the modes of revealing allotted to him. (…) 
Modern technology, as a revealing which orders, is thus no mere human doing. 
Therefore we must take the challenging, which (…) gathers man into ordering. 
(…) We now name that challenging claim which gathers man thither to order 
the self-revealing as (…) “Ge-stell” [enframing] (Heidegger 1977, 300–301). 
And further on, Heidegger describes what technology is not:
This work is therefore neither only a human activity nor a mere means within 
such activity. The merely instrumental, merely anthropological definition of 
technology is therefore in principle untenable. And it may not be rounded out 
by being referred back to some metaphysical or religious explanation that un­
dergirds it (Heidegger 1977, 302).
At this point I have to return to a passage already quoted, which talked 
about this special relationship of man with technology and truth, for Hei­
degger to ask once again:
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Does such revealing happen somewhere beyond all human doing? No. But nei­
ther does it happen exclusively in man, or definitively through man. (…) Al­
ways the unconcealment of that which is goes upon a way of revealing. Always 
the destining of revealing holds complete sway over man. But that destining is 
never a fate that compels. For man becomes truly free only insofar as he (…) 
becomes one who listens, though not one who simply obeys (Heidegger 1977, 
305–306).
And then on to a final conclusion:
But when we consider the essence of technology we experience enframing 
as a destining of revealing. In this way we are already sojourning within the 
open space of destining, a destining that in no way confines us to a stultified 
compulsion to push on blindly with technology or, what comes to the same, 
to rebel helplessly against it and curse it as the work of the devil. Quite to the 
contrary, when we once open ourselves expressly to the essence of technol­
ogy we find ourselves taken into a freeing claim (Heidegger 1977, 307).
More specifically, Heidegger states that there are two possibilities, 
namely:
(…) the possibility of pursuing and pushing forward nothing but what is re­
vealed in ordering, and of deriving all his standards on this basis. Through this 
the other possibility is blocked, that man might be admitted more and sooner 
and ever more primally to the essence of what is unconcealed  and to its un­
concealment, in order that he might experience as his essence the requisite 
belonging to revealing. (…) The destining of revealing is as such, in every one of 
its modes, and therefore necessarily, danger (Heidegger 1977, 307).
Therefore, the human situation in relation to technology is complicat­
ed by the fact that mortal danger belongs to the essence of technology:
The actual threat has already afflicted man in his essence. The rule of enfram­
ing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter 
into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more pri­
mal truth. Thus where enframing reigns, there is danger in the highest sense 
(Heidegger 1977, 309). 
All of these complex human relationships with technology are summa­
rised in the following statement: “(…) we consider, finally, that the com­
ing to presence of the essence of technology (…) needs and uses man (…) 
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one who is needed and used for the safekeeping of the essence of truth.” 
(Heidegger 1977, 314). Indeed, an excerpt from Rilke’s letter of November 
13, 1925 seems to be the affecting and thrilling concretisation of these: 
“(…) our task is to impress this preliminary, transient earth upon ourselves 
with so much suffering and so passionately that its nature rises up again 
‘invisibly’ within us” (Heidegger 1977, 130).
Coping with this danger reconstructs the characteristic syllogism: 
“To save” is to fetch something home into its essence, in order to bring the 
essence for the first time into its genuine appearing. If the essence of tech­
nology, enframing, is the extreme danger (…) The essence of technology must 
harbor in itself the growth of the saving power (Heidegger 1977, 310).
This syllogism clearly shows that the focus on the essence of technol­
ogy can be associated not only with fears, but also hopes, as its premises 
suggests. 
The excerpts analysed above show that within the framework of the 
general approach to instrumentalization, it is possible to distinguish its 
form, which does not necessarily and/or does not always come down to 
denial of the truth of being, carried out in the mode of “violation.” By limit­
ing himself “only” to the use of an object in a function not specific to it, he 
gives it (at least sometimes) a creative character. Distinguishing this form 
of instrumentalization seems to be at the same time an affirmative answer 
to the question concerning the implementation of the specific objective.
2. STRONG FORM OF INSTRUMENTALIZATION – 
RECONSTRUCTION OF SELECTED TOPICS HEIDEGGER’S 
WHAT ARE POETS FOR?
The title of this section not only suggests, but also explicitly imposes the 
need to recall and paraphrase the above-quoted motto: Where have we 
gone wrong? Where are we? We ask the question about instrumentaliza­
tion, and we have reached the vanity of time, the role of poetry and poets 
in destitute time. What connects instrumentalization with destitute time? 
The answer is “everything.” The first signals of this relationship can be 
found on the introductory pages of this essay. Heidegger wrote:
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The time remains destitute not only because God is dead, but because mor­
tals are hardly aware and capable even of their own mortality. Mortals have 
not yet come into ownership of their own nature. 
(…) The time is destitute because it lacks the unconcealedness of the na­
ture of pain, death, and love. This destitution is itself destitute because that 
realm of being withdraws within which pain and death and love belong togeth­
er. (…) That realm is the truth of particular beings (…) (Heidegger, 1971, 96–98).
These statements remain valid not only in relation to human nature, 
love, pain and death, but also to the nature of virtually all things and their 
relationships. Similarly, mortals will be able to exit destitute time when 
they find their way to their nature and the relationships between them. In 
this way, both their nature and their relationships become – because they 
must become – the subject of ontological analyses. Without these analy­
ses, this way out or break out is simply impossible. This is the summary of 
excerpts of Heidegger’s ontology that are significant for all further analysis. 
It contains categories in which comparative analysis will be conducted, on 
the one hand, on the world of things, plants and animals, and, on the oth­
er, the world of human beings – their status and functioning, within which 
their specific nature is associated with different degrees of consciousness:
Like all beings, we are in being only by being ventured in the venture of Being. 
But because, as the beings who will, we go with the venture, we are more ven­
turesome and thus sooner exposed to danger. When man entrenches himself 
in purposeful self-assertion, and by means of absolute objectification installs 
himself in the parting against the Open, then he himself promotes his own 
unshieldedness (Heidegger 1971, 119–120).
It is with these degrees of consciousness, and more precisely with the 
increase of consciousness in man, that the difference between them is 
associated:
(…) that the animal’s degree of consciousness set it into the world without the 
animal’s placing the world over against itself at every moment (as we do); 
the animal is in the world; we stand before it by virtue of that peculiar turn 
and intensification which our consciousness has taken. (…) that belongs to rep­
resentation that Nature is brought before man. Man places before himself the 
world as the whole of everything objective, and he places himself before 
the world. Man sets up the world toward himself, and delivers Nature over 
to himself. We must think of this placing-here, in its broad and multifarious 
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nature. Where Nature is not satisfactory to man’s representation, he reframes 
or redisposes it. (…) By multifarious producing, the world is brought to stand 
and into position. The Open becomes an object, and is thus twisted around 
toward the human being (Heidegger 1971, 108–110).
Heidegger’s further reasoning comes to instrumentalization in a few 
steps. The first of these introduces the category of self-assertion termed 
as willing:
Over against the world as the object, man stations himself and sets himself up 
as the one who deliberately pushes through all this producing.
To put something before ourselves, propose it, in such a way that what has 
been proposed, having first been represented, determines all the modes of 
production in every respect, is a basic characteristic of the attitude which 
we know as willing. The willing of which we are speaking here is production, 
placing-here, and this in the sense of objectification purposely putting itself 
through, asserting itself. (…)
The willing of which we speak here is the putting-through, the self-assertion, 
whose purpose has already posited the world as the whole of producible ob­
jects. This willing determines the nature of modern man, (…). By such will­
ing, modern man turns out to be the being who, in all relations to all that is, 
and thus in his relation to himself as well, rises up as the producer who puts 
through, carries out, his own self and establishes this uprising as the absolute 
rule. The whole objective inventory in terms of which the world appears is 
given over to, commended to, and thus subjected to the command of self-as­
sertive production. Willing has in it the character of command (…) (Heidegger 
1971, 110–111).
The next steps are focused on the consequences of this desire in 
the environment and the world. The first concerns more or less direct 
consequences:
Correspondingly, human willing too can be in the mode of self-assertion only 
by forcing everything under its dominion from the start, even before it can 
survey it. To such a willing, everything, beforehand and thus subsequently, 
turns irresistibly into material for self-assertive production. The earth and 
its atmosphere become raw material. Man becomes human material, which 
is disposed of with a view to proposed goals. The unconditioned establish­
ment of the unconditional self-assertion by which the world is purposefully 
made over according to the frame of mind of man’s command is a process that 
emerges from the hidden nature of technology (Heidegger 1971, 111).
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The second step, however, concerns further consequences:
In place of all the world-content of things that was formerly perceived and 
used to grant freely of itself, the object-character of technological dominion 
spreads itself over the earth ever more quickly, ruthlessly, and completely. Not 
only does it establish all things as producible in the process of production; it also 
delivers the products of production by means of the market. In self-assertive 
production, the humanness of man and thingness of things dissolve into the 
calculated market value of a market which not only spans the whole earth as 
a world market, but also, as the will to will trades in the nature of Being and thus 
subjects all beings to the trade of a calculation that dominates most tenaciously 
in those areas where there is no need of numbers (Heidegger 1971, 114–115).
And now quite specifically, Heidegger declares: “Self-assertive man, 
whether or not he knows and wills it as an individual, is the functionary of 
technology” (Heidegger 1971, 116).
Finally, he describes the human condition in the world as follows:
Self-willing man everywhere reckons with things and men as with objects. 
What is so reckoned becomes merchandise. Everything is constantly changed 
about into new orders. The parting against the pure draft establishes itself 
within the unstilled agitation of the constantly balancing balance. By its ob­
jectification of the world, the parting, contrary to its own intention, promotes 
inconstancy. Thus ventured into the unshielded, man moves within the me­
dium of “businesses” and “exchanges.” Self-assertive man lives by staking his 
will. He lives essentially by risking his nature in the vibration of money and the 
currency of values. At this constant trader and middleman, man is the “mer­
chant.” He weighs and measures constantly, yet does not know the real weight 
of things. Nor does he ever know what in himself is truly weighty and prepon­
derant (Heidegger 1971, 135).
As a consequence, Heidegger then tells us:
What has long since been threatening man with death, and indeed with the 
death of his own nature, is the unconditional character of mere willing in 
the sense of purposeful self-assertion in everything. (…)
It is not only the totality of this willing that is dangerous, but willing itself, in the 
form of self-assertion within a world that is admitted only as will. (…) But above 
all, technology itself prevents any experience of its nature. (…) The danger con­
sists in the threat that assaults man’s nature in his relation to Being itself, and 
not in accidental perils. This danger is the danger (Heidegger 1971, 116–117).
INSTRUMENTALIZATION AS A SIN OF UNTRUTH 105
The seriousness of this threat or danger naturally directs one’s atten­
tion towards seeking rescue. The reconstruction of its course, conditions 
that would have to be met, and significant mechanisms in this respect all 
go in different directions. At the very beginning of the essay it is said:
Long is the time because even terror, taken by itself as a ground for turning, is 
powerless as long as there is no turn with mortal men. But there is a turn with 
mortals, when these find the way to their own nature. That nature lies in this, 
that mortals reach into the abyss sooner than the heavenly powers. Mortals, 
when we think of their nature, remain closer to that absence because they are 
touched by presence, the ancient name of Being (Heidegger 1971, 93).
Later, there are further significant moments in this respect: “The salva­
tion must come from where there is a turn with mortals in their nature. 
Are there mortals who reach sooner into the abyss of the destitute and 
its destituteness?” (Heidegger 1971, 118). It is characteristic that certain 
partial questions are formulated, while sometimes answers are formulated 
and the conditions included therein: “Can there, however, be a heightening 
of this willing beyond the absolute of purposeful self-assertion? No.” (Hei­
degger 1971, 119). The most interesting question seems to be formulated 
at a high level of generality and announcing the answer at the level of gen­
erality appropriate for ontology:
(…) what is there still to be dared that would be still more daring than Life, 
which is itself the daring venture, so that it would be more daring than the Be­
ing of beings? In every case and in every respect, what is dared must be such 
that is concerns every being in as much as it is a being. Of such a kind is Being, 
and in this way, that it is not one particular kind among others, but the mode 
of all beings as such.
If Being is what is unique to beings, by what can Being still be surpassed? Only 
by itself, only by its own, and indeed by expressly entering into its own. Then 
Being would be the unique which wholly surpasses itself (the transcendens 
pure and simple). But this surpassing, this transcending does not go up and 
over into something else: it comes up to its own self and back into the na­
ture of its truth. Being itself traverses this going over and is itself its dimension 
(Heidegger 1971, 131).
The analysis of the excerpts cited above proves that apart from the 
poorly understood concept of instrumentalization (understood as a crea­
tive attitude to an object), its strong form can also be distinguished. Indeed, 
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this is what it can (and even should) be understood as in terms of deny­
ing the truth of being. Thus, once again, the question about the implemen­
tation of the specific goal of the discussed considerations can be answered 
in the affirmative.
3. HEURISTIC VALUE OF THE RHETORIC OF SIN
The title of this paper calls for a new look at the otherwise (apparently?) 
well-known phenomenon of instrumentalization in its two forms in con­
text, as well as from the perspective of two of Heidegger’s texts. As a re­
sult, instrumentalization, and more specifically its strong form, appears as 
the outcome of reinterpretation. It is therefore appropriate to look first 
at the reinterpretation itself undertaken here, and then at its result. I will 
do this by using two distinctions commonly used in scientific studies (from 
the “meta” level), and then I will take a closer look at instrumentalization 
from the perspective of cognitive science, and more precisely its subject 
matter, i.e. cognition. This is because instrumentalization – in both its 
strong and weak forms – has been included as a specific way of cognition.
A meta-theoretical reflection on the reinterpretation procedure itself 
and its result in terms of immanent and transcendent criticism can show 
whether this procedure was performed in accordance with the rules of 
art, and thus whether it was, as it was supposed to be, a reinterpretation 
(from the position of immanent criticism). This is because gaining a new 
approach to instrumentalization is no better procedure than reinterpreting 
it (from the position of transcendent criticism). It seems to me that what 
I have done here complies with the essence of reinterpretation.
While formulating the question concerning the status and value of this 
operation in terms of the context of discovery and justification, one should 
check whether this new look at instrumentalization and its reinterpretation is 
“merely” a discovery. This is because it has turned out here that even an ac­
cidental reading of Heidegger’s texts meant that instrumentalization can be 
described differently (a new possibility was discovered in this respect), or 
whether it not only “merely” discovered, but also justified enough that it can 
no longer give rise to any doubts as to its value. In other words – is this rein­
terpretation merely acceptable in discovering, within which “anything goes,” 
or does it require additional, special justifications? Although in this study 
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I would like to stay within the order of discovery as it seemed important to 
confirm the value of this discovery, it was possible to “spot” these two forms 
of instrumentalization in Heidegger’s texts and to identify them clearly.
In the analysis and assessment of the reinterpretation presented here 
and its result, carried out at the subject level, one must start from the dis­
tinction in cognitive science between cognitive behaviour and effective 
behaviour and – by analogy – cognitive control and effective (behaviour­
al) control and ask if the adopted rhetoric of sin allows us to describe the 
strong form of instrumentalization as a procedure that allows one to know 
something about an instrumentalized object, or as its mere use. The same 
applies to the weak form of instrumentalization, although it is not clear at 
this time what the negative (non-sin) would be, but also some positive and 
appropriate rhetoric.
Therefore, the question is: does the rhetoric of sin allow us to treat 
strongly understood instrumentalization as learning about an instrumen­
talized object, and not only as unworthy of using it in a non-specific func­
tion? One way or the other, the answer is complicated by two factors. 
Firstly, it is known that cognition is provided not only by cognitive behav­
iour but also by effective behaviour (as a result of changes in reality). Sec­
ondly, it is not known whether instrumentalization must be performed 
first in speech and thought, and then in deed, or just neglect, that is, “ig­
norance” or “disrespect” in all the meanings of these words – that is also 
thought, speech and deed. This complexity is also confirmed by the fact 
that, like some cases of weakly understood instrumentalization, they can 
be treated as creativity (they have then primarily a cognitive sense), and by 
analogy, some cases of strongly understood instrumentalization – the sin – 
can provide cognition. In some of its concretisations, strongly understood 
instrumentalization is the discovery of the possibility of using an object in 
a non-specific function. As an example of this specific form of instrumen­
talization, military reconnaissance can be used. In this case, we are deal­
ing with the fulfilment of all conditions of instrumentalization in the strong 
sense of the term: non-specific use of a battle as reconnaissance and the 
unworthy using of scouts. Whoever sends scouts into battle counts on this, 
and maybe even assumes that none of them will survive, even doing so to 
learn a lot about the enemy.
The example given is a sign of the special complexity of our situation 
in which we analyse, including comparative and contrasting analysis, these 
two forms of instrumentalization – weak and strong. This leads to the 
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need to treat cases precisely, which collectively is called “blessed guilt;” al­
though – as it turns out – not only such. There are also so-called situations 
without a solution – both prudent and ethical (Chyrowicz 2008). In analysing 
them, there is a thread of two/many effects, as well as their diverse position 
and importance – if we consider them due to an agent trying to get out of 
a dead end. When we try to analyse cases of blessed guilt using the multi-
effect category, the question immediately arises whether this refers to the 
whole situation in which this blessed guilt takes place, or only to some of 
them (and which ones?). This in turn makes it possible to make the subject 
of analysis – otherwise clear – all cases that are located in the central area of 
the continuum, one pole being weak instrumentalization and the other be­
ing strong instrumentalization. By way of example, one can ask whether 
the category of “consuming religion” terms any actions as instrumentaliza­
tion at all. Furthermore, if it is really instrumentalization, is it just a weak 
or already a strong form, and even whether there is only a danger that it 
can transform into strong form of instrumentalization (not even knowing 
when this occurs). Another interesting example is Pascal’s triangle, which 
I will not discuss in detail here, as it would go beyond the scope of these 
considerations. With some objections, however, I have decided to mention 
as an example a very special case of instrumentalization. This concerns the 
cook described in the classic Polish novel, Pan Tadeusz, who instrumental­
ized a rapier by using it as a spit. Although, she was described as “godless” 
just because she made a spit of a rapier, which has always been more than 
a weapon of war for its owner, it was, of course, never considered some­
thing divine. This case is interesting in the context of these considerations, 
that the sin of ungodliness attributed to the cook was practically absent. 
At this point, I would like to interrupt these general considerations 
and get to the specifics, in the context of which the analysed cases are 
much clearer and may even appear to be completely unambiguous. How­
ever, I will limit myself only to their indication. These include the following 
matters:
– the circumstances in which instrumentalization takes place (weak, 
strong or maybe none at all);
– the motivation behind the decisions of the agent of instrumental­
izing activities (weak, strong or maybe none at all?);
– the presence of masking activities on the one hand, and, on the 
other hand, justifying instrumentalizing activities (weak, strong or 
maybe none at all). 
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The last point requires a brief comment. The type of activity is signifi­
cant for its assessment – concealment confirms that the agent knows that 
he is doing wrong more strongly than justification, because justifying the 
agent implies that there are some “mitigating circumstances.” These are 
significant for assessing the agent’s activity in terms of “what led him into 
temptation and in which direction.”
Finally, let me return to the level of general consideration, even at the 
risk of stating the obvious. Whether instrumentalization took place at all, 
whether it was its strong or weak form, also depends largely on “matter” 
or the area of activity, which fundamentally determines whether sin oc­
curred, whether it was venial, serious or even mortal, but does not go as 
far as so-called situational ethics. 
I think that in the end I can show that one can successfully defend, or 
at least try to defend, the statement that the adopted rhetoric of sin al­
lows us to see sharper, more clearly in delight, to use the expression of Jan 
Błoński – the truth of the subject; first of all, an instrumentalized object, 
and perhaps also itself as an instrumentalizing subject (maybe without de­
light?). Let me add to the great figures and words already mentioned in 
different places here the figure and words of Thomas à Kempis. I will do 
this for the Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden, and through him for his 
teacher, Kazimierz Twardowski, who quoted Kempis’ The Imitation of Christ 
in the last sentence of his inaugural lecture at the University of Lviv by say­
ing: “The whole world will not make him proud whom truth has subjected 
to itself” (Kempis).
In placing a strong form of instrumentalization in the foreground of 
these considerations, one characterised in terms of a denial of the truth 
of being and that of a kind of violence against it, I see in the above-ana­
lysed excerpts of Heidegger’s texts a suggestion, or even encouragement 
to adopt the rhetoric of sin in order to describe it.
CONCLUSIONS
In attempting to make a concise and comprehensive assessment of the 
results of the above-mentioned analyses of excerpts of Heidegger’s texts, 
and to answer the question whether the intended research goal has been 
achieved, I allow myself to answer in the affirmative. Thus, it is possible to 
perceive instrumentalization in terms of the denial of the truth of being, 
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to distinguish at least two forms of instrumentalization, and, additional­
ly, to use the rhetoric of sin for this purpose. Finally, in allowing myself 
a slightly playful tone, I cannot help but feel that the texts I have chosen 
for analysis were written especially for me…
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